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Nearly all known biological warfare agents are intended for aerosol application. Although less
effective as potablewater threats, manyarepotentially capable ofinflictingheavycasualties when
ingested. Significant loss ofmission capability can be anticipated even when complete recovery is
possible. Properly maintained field army water purification equipment can counter this dbeat,
but personnel responsible for the operation and maintenance ofthe equipment may be most at
risk of exposure. Municipal water treatment facilities would be measurbly less efcive. Some
replicating (infectious) agents and a few biotoxins are inactivated by chlorine disinfection; for
others chlorine is ineffective or ofUnknown efficacy. This report as the state ofour knowl-
edge ofagents as potable water threats and contemplates the consequences ofintentional or col-
lateral contamination ofpotablewatersupplies by 18 replicatingagents and 9 biotoxins known or
likely to be weaponized or otherwise used as threats. Key wordk bacteria, biological warfare,
potable water, protozoa, rickettsia, toxin, virs. Environ Healtb Prrpect 107:975-984 (1999).
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Most biological warfare (BW) agents,
whether replicating (infectious) agents or
derived toxins, have been weaponized for an
aerosol assault, and the threat is primarily to
the respiratory tract, not to the digestive sys-
tem. Infectious agents are more immediately
incapacitating when respired and, as noted by
Franz (1), "the effects of most toxins are
more severe when inhaled than when they
are consumed in food." Some of the infec-
tious agents-Shigella spp. and Vibrio choker-
ae, for example-are obvious water threats,
and most biotoxins would probably be effec-
tive threats to drinking water under suitable
conditions. For some others, however, either
there is no known infectious path through
ingestion or the agent cannot survive in
water. This report evaluates the potential
threat to potable water supplies from recog-
nized BW agents that are known or are likely
to be weaponized. Agents were selected from
various official documents, contractor
reports, and reviews [most notably the text of
Sidell et al. (2)]. This report is intended to
provide guidance to field preventive medicine
personnel as well as to identify deficiencies in
the data. The emphasis is on concerns ofthe
field army, but many findings apply to
municipal systems as well. Other aspects of
evaluation include clinical considerations,
infective/toxic dose, environmental stability,
disinfection efficacy, and removal by treat-
ment systems.
Clinical Considerations
We emphasize signs and symptoms suggest-
ing immediate or rapid loss ofmission capa-
bility rather than long-term adverse effects.
The nature of the illness may be different
depending on whether the agent is inhaled
or ingested, or as noted by Franz (1),
Some toxins can elicit a significantly different
clinical picture when the route of exposure is
changed, a phenomenon that may confound
diagnosis and delay treatment.
Diagnosis after the appearance ofsymptoms
maybe too late for effective treatment.
Infective/Toxic Dose
For most ofthe biotoxins, only rodent medi-
an lethal dose (LD50) values are available to
indicate relative toxicity. In the absence of
more useful data, we used the screening
dose, LD50/104 expressed in milligrams per
liter [derived by Layton et al. (3) and based
on earlier studies by McNamara (4)], to rep-
resent the highest no-observed-adverse-effect
level for soldiers (NOAELS) consuming 15
L/dayofwater. Thus,
NOAEL5(mg/L)= -(LD50x0.004) 70
100 15
LD50
104
where 0.004, in day1l, is the ratio of the rat
oral subchronic NOAEL (milligrams per kilo-
gram per day) to LD50 (milligrams per kilo-
gram) corresponding to the 10th cumulative
percentile of the lognormal distribution for
33 representative substances (4), 70 is the
standard weight of the soldier in kilograms,
and 100 is the interspecies safety factor. For
the few cases where LD50 values have been
estimated for humans, the NOAELI is taken
to be LD 0/100, thereby eliminating the
rodent-to-human safety factor. For the pur-
pose ofpredicting performance decrement, it
is assumed that no adverse effect will occur at
adose below this highly conservative number.
Individual susceptibility to infectious
agents may vary widely. The incidence of
shigellosis among infants and children, for
example, is much higher than among adults.
Differences in virulence of various agent
strains, as well as differences in individual
susceptibility, may account for the large
(powers of 10) differences in infective dose
quoted by different authors for many agents.
Furthermore, for many replicating agents, the
infective dose is known for inhalation but not
ingestion, and it has been necessary to make
the generally conservative assumption that
they are equal. In this paper we made every
effort to identify an infective dose applicable
to healthy young adults, but it should be rec-
ognized that great differences in susceptibility
can occur even within this select group. The
drinking water equivalent ofinfective dose, in
organisms per liter, has been calculated by
dividing the literature value by 7, the maxi-
mum number ofdays personnel are presumed
to occupyanuclear/biological/lchemical battle-
field, and by 15 or 5 for consumption of 15
and 5 L/day of water, respectively. The
derivedvalues arehighlyconservative in that it
is assumed that infectious organisms are accu-
mulated over 7 days and are not deared from
the system. A general relation between the
probability (p) ofinfection (but not necessarily
illness), the average dose oforganisms ingested
(AM, and the average infective dose (k) (5) can
bederived as follows:p = 1 -exp(-NMk).
Environmental Stability
Data have been sought to indicate the stabil-
ity of biotoxins or survival of infectious
agents in water and to indicate the effects of
heat, light, and drying on BWagents.
Disinfection Efficacy
Data have been sought to indicate whether
BW agents are inactivated under normal
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conditions offield drinking water disinfection
[i.e., 2.0 mg/L free available chlorine (FAC)
for 30 min at temperatures > 150C] or under
the less rigorous conditions commonly tised
for municipal treatment. In general, such data
are available only for the common waterborne
pathogens. 'The knowledge that certain BW
agents are inactivated by chlorine bleach or
other disinfectants is useful for decontaminat-
ing surfaces, but not for developing water dis-
infection criteria. In a few cases, the efficacy
of chemicals used for disinfecting personal
water supplies, such as chlorine dioxide (6),
iodine tablets [tetraglycine hydroperiodide or
Globaline (Van Ben Industries, Long Island,
NY)] (7), and sodium dichloro-isocyanurate
(Chlor-Floc; Control Chemical Company,
South Africa) (7), has been tested.
Removal by Treatment
Systems
The army's mobile field water treatment sys-
tem is the reverse osmosis water purification
tinit (ROWPU), in which the reverse osmo-
sis (RO) membranes are preceded by coagu-
lation/flocculation and multimedia filtration,
similar (except for the membranes) to sys-
tems used by municipalities for treating stir-
face waters. The membranes are additionally
protected by spiral-wound cotton prefilters of
5-pm nominal pore size. Although removal
by RO has been measured for only a few
BW agents, it has been assumed that an
intact RO membrane will exclude virtually
all infectious agents and all but the smallest
biotoxins because of size exclusion. By the
same principle, microfiltration should exclude
parasites and most bacteria, but not viruses or
toxins, whereas ultrafiltration should excltide
all infectious agents and possibly a few pro-
teinaceous toxins. The principle ofsize exclu-
sion has important exceptions, however.
Adham et al. (8) found in bench studies that
removal of MS-2 bacterial virus (a simulant
for enteric virtises) by composite RO mem-
branes can vary from < 2 log10 to > 7 log1(,
depending on the selection of membrane,
apparently because of differences in quality
control. Madaeni (9) documented other
cases where size exclusion ofmicroorganisms
is violated in membrane filtration, and
Ramachandran et al. (10) observed apparent
passage ofsome Bacillus subtilus spores from
heavily contaminated source water in field
tests ofthe ROWPU.
Because the ROWPU rejects two-thirds
of the intake raw water, bypassing the mem-
branes to increase water production from
fresh water sources has received serious con-
sideration. However, almost no information
was recovered concerning the removal ofBW
agents from water by conventional municipal
treatment facilities. In the absence of RO
membranes, the ROWPU multimedia
filtration system can achieve 1-2 logl0 reduc-
tion ofBacillusglobigii spores and Escherichia
coli and slightly < 1 logl0 reduction of
poliovirus 1, total aerobic bacteria, and total
enteric bacteria (11). Well-operated munici-
pal systems (omitting consideration of disin-
fection) should readily meet or exceed this
performance (12,13). The standard cartridge
filters do not appear to contribute substan-
tially to overall microbial removals (11,14).
There are many hand-held individual (15)
and point-of-use drinking water treatment
devices on the market; most use ceramic or
depth filters, some include activated carbon,
and several utilize RO. Some incorporate a
disinfectant, commonly an iodinated resin or
silver. Although many of these devices have
excellent potential for treating BW agent-
contaminated water, almost none have been
adequately tested for this purpose.
Findings
Anthrax
Anthrax is a highly infectious disease of
hooved animals that is readily transmitted to
hurmans, although individual stisceptibility
varies widely. It is caused by a spore-forming
bacterium, Bacillus anthracis, which has been
weaponized for aerosol application by Iraq
(16-18) and others, and was used by the
Japanese Army during World War II to con-
taminate food and water supplies ofChinese
cities (19).
The three recognized forms ofdisease in
humans are cutaneous (the most common),
pulmonary (the BW target), and gastroin-
testinal. Gastrointestinal anthrax is usually
the result of consuming contaminated meat
from infected animals and is much less com-
mon than the other forms in developed
nations. According to Watson and Keir (20),
Abdominal pain, fever, vomiting, bloody diar-
rhoca anid shock are the principal mnanifestationIs
of this form of the disease, which has anl inictuba-
tionl period of 2-7 days. As with pulmonary
antthrax, mortality is relatively high becatuse of
the faillre to nmake a diagnosis in time for treat-
eiient to) be effectise.
The clinical aspects of anthrax are also dis-
ctissed by Eitzen et al. (18), Friedlander
(21), Benenson (22), BUMED (23), and
Franz et al. (24).
Because anthrax can be transmitted
among animals through ingestion of spore-
contaminated water (20), we suspect that
humans can be similarly infected, although
cattle are much more susceptible. A worst-
case critical dose via the inhalation route is
estimated as 6,000 spores (20), correspond-
ing to a drinking water concentration of 57
spores/L for consumption of 15 L/day over 7
days or 171 spores/L for consumption of 5
L/day. Less conservative estimates ofinfective
dose [median infective dose (ID50) values]
are 20,000 spores (25) and 8,000-50,000
spores (18,24).
B. anthracis spores are indefinitely stable
in the environment; they stirvive for 2 years
in pond water (26) and 40 years or more in
soil (18,26). The spores are also heat resis-
tant but are inactivated in water after 25 min
at 95°C (26).
Although the vegetative form of B.
anthracis is deactivated by chlorine disinfec-
tion under field conditions (> 99.6% kill, 20
min, 5 mg/L FAC, ambient temperature)
(27), the spore form is highly resistant. It is,
however, readily destroyed on contaminated
surfaces by application of 5-10% chlorine
bleach orformaldehyde.
Anthrax spores are removed by any water
treatment filter system with pore size < 1
pm, which would include the ROWPU,
microfilters, and probably many individual
water purifiers. If the ROWPU membranes
are bypassed, the multimedia filter and stan-
dard prefilter (5-pm nominal pore size) will
remove some but not all anthrax spores, and
further reduction will not be achieved
through disinfection. In the case of the
ROWPU and many of the individual water
purifiers, cleaning or replacing contaminated
filter units could present a serious cutaneous
exposure hazard to personnel performing
this task.
Brucellosis
The causative agents of brucellosis are
Brucella melitensis and Brucella suis-, the latter
has been weaponized for aerosol application
(19,24,28). Because brucellosis is contracted
through consumption ofcontaminated milk,
it is prudent to consider water a potential
route ofinfection (29).
Brucellosis is a highly infectious disease
ofanimals; in humans it is known as undu-
lant or Malta fever and is characterized by
fever, sweating, malaise, aches, and pains
(30), with an onset of3 days to several weeks
(28). Symptoms intensify, then diminish,
with a gradual rise in intensity. The disease
is incapacitating, but the case-fatality rate is
low (18,31).
Eitzen et al. (18) and Franz et al. (24) list
an aerosol infective dose of 10-100 Bruce/la
organisms; McGeorge (25) quotes an ID50 by
unspecified route of 10,000 organisms for Br.
suis, and Jensen et al. (32) reference an effec-
tive oral dose (ED50) of 106 for unspecified
Bruce/la. A dose of 10,000 organisms would
correspond to a drinking water concentration
ofapproximately 100 organisms/L for con-
sumption of 15 L/day or 300 organisms/L for
consumption of5 L/day for 7days.
Br. melitensis may survive in soil for
7-69 days and in water for 20-72 days; it is
inactivated by direct sunlight (26).
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Br. melitensis is inactivated by 1% sodi-
um hypochlorite (26), but we did not find
any reference to its tolerance to hypochlorite
under usual conditions of drinking water
disinfection.
Cholera
Cholera is an acute infectious disease of
humans that is caused by the ingestion of
food or water contaminated by the bacteri-
um Vibrio cholerae. V. cholerae was used by
the Japanese Army during World War II to
contaminate food and water supplies of
Chinese cities (19) and is thought to have
been utilized as a terrorist weapon to conta-
minate potablewater (25).
Cholera is a disease ofthe intestinal tract,
with an incubation period of 1-5 days,
depending on the initial dosage and the
resistance of the host. Signs and symptoms
are a profuse watery diarrhea, rapid dehydra-
tion, and a state ofcollapse. Treatment con-
sists ofreplacement offluid and electrolytes;
untreated, the victim may die within hours
after the onset ofsymptoms (30,31).
An ingested dose of 103 organisms is
infectious in a healthy individual (33),
although Jensen et al. (32) quote an infective
dose of108 organisms. The lesser dosewould
correspond to adrinking water concentration
of 10 organisms/L for consumption of 15
L/day or 30 organisms/L for consumption of
5 L/dayfor 7 days.
V. cholerae survives as long as 6 weeks in
some waters containing organic matter, up
to 24 hr in sewage, and 16 days in soil; it is
sensitive to heat, sunlight, and drying, but
resists freezing (18,26).
V. cholerae is easily killed by chlorine
(34), and cholera is virtually unknown in sit-
uations where water supplies are properly
disinfected. However, Rycus et al. (35) state,
without documentation, that V. cholerae
is"tolerant to residual chlorine" (35).
Clostridium Perfringens
Clostridium pefingens is a common organ-
ism in secondary sewage effluent. The spores
may have potential for weaponization in
aerosol form. No reference suggesting poten-
tial as an agent ofdrinking water contamina-
tion was recovered, although incidents of
food poisoning are common (31), and inves-
tigators in Iraq have researched Cperfingens
(17) or toxins thereof(18).
C. perfringens, an anaerobe, causes gas
gangrene in wounds. Signs and symptoms of
food poisoning, which include abdominal
pain, diarrhea, and possibly nausea, usually
appear 8-12 hr after consumption (31).
Freeman (31) suggests that an infective
dose would involve foods (e.g., poultry) con-
taining several million C. perfringens per
gram, which could correspond to a drinking
water concentration of approximately 106/L
for consumption of 15 L/day over 7 days, or
107/L for consumption of5 L/day.
C perfringens is presumed to be indefi-
nitelystable in sewage.
C. pefringens, a spore former used as an
indicator organism, is relatively insensitive to
inactivation by chlorine. It is reduced by < 1
loglo under treatment with a chlorine resid-
ual of 1.2 mg/L for 15 min at 20°C and a
pH ofapproximately 7 (36).
Glanders
Glanders is primarily a debilitating disease of
horses, but it is transmissible to humans.
Glanders is caused by the bacillus
Burkholderia (formerly Pseudomonas) mallei.
Glanders may have been weaponized in
aerosol form; a single reference suggesting its
potential as an agent ofdrinkingwater conta-
mination was recovered (29). According to
Freeman (31), however, "meat from glan-
dered animals has been ingested without
resulting infection."
Inflammation of mucus membranes of
the nose is common, and acute infection may
result in death in a fewdays orweeks (31).
An ID50 of3.2 x 106 organisms has been
estimated (32), corresponding to a drinking
water concentration of - 3 x 104 organ-
isms/L for consumption of 15 L/day or 9 X
104 organisms/L for consumption of5 L/day
for 7 days.
Bu. malleisurvives in water at room tem-
perature for up to 30 days and in soil for
more than 27 days (26), but it is apparently
not naturallyfound in soil orwater (18).
Bu. mallei is inactivated by 1% sodium
hypochlorite (26), but no reference to its tol-
erance to hypochlorite under usual conditions
ofdrinkingwaterdisinfection was recovered.
Melioidosis
Melioidosis, caused by the bacillus
Burkholderia (formerly Pseudomonas) pseudo-
mallei, is a disease of rodents and domestic
animals, and also occurs in humans (31). It is
cited as a potential adversary agent, presum-
ably aerosolized, but is not known to have
been used or acquired (25). Bu. pseudomalei
is transmitted among rodents by biting
insects; human disease can becaused byinges-
tion or by contact with contaminated water
through overt or inapparent skin wounds or
aspiration ofcontaminatedwater (22,29).
The most serious form of melioidosis in
humans, an acute septicemic condition with
diarrhea, has a high case-fatality rate if
untreated (31).
The infective dose of meliodiosis is
unknown; Parker et al. (26) state that it sur-
vives foryears in soil andwater.
Bu. pseudomallei is inactivated by 1%
sodium hypochlorite (26), but no reference
to its tolerance to hypochlorite under the
usual conditions of drinking water disinfec-
tion was recovered.
Plague
Plague is a disease ofrodents, both wild and
domestic, caused by the bacillus Yersinia
pestis and transmissible to humans. Y1 pestis
may have been weaponized in aerosol form
and should be considered a threat in water as
well (25,32). Cultures were used by the
Japanese Army duringWorld War II to con-
taminate food and water supplies ofChinese
cities (18,37).
There are three major clinical forms of
plague: bubonic, septicemic, and pneumon-
ic. Signs and symptoms vary, but all forms
appear to be characterized by high fever, tox-
emia, and prostration within 2-5 days after
infection, with death a frequent outcome.
Pneumonic plague can be spread by cough-
ing (18,30,31,38).
An aerosolization ID50 of3,000 organisms
has been estimated (25); others suggest an
infective dose of 100-500 organisms (24) or
1,000 (26) organisms byinhalation. Cooperet
al. (39) presented a procedure for estimating
the percentage of troops likely to become ill
from ingestion of Yersinia spp. depending on
the raw water source and the degree of treat-
ment. They estimate a geometric mean infec-
tious dose of 70 organisms by ingestion. A
dose of70 organisms would correspond to a
drinking water concentration < 1 organism/L
for consumption of 15 L/day or 2 organ-
isms/Lforconsumption of5 L/dayfor7 days.
1Ypestissurvives in water for 16 days and
in moist soil for > 60 days (26); it is viable
for some time in dry sputum, flea feces, and
buried bodies (18). It is inactivated in < 15
min by heating to 55°C (26) to 72°C (18)
and it is killed after several hours of direct
sunlight (18).
K pestis is inactivated by 1% sodium
hypochlorite (26), but no reference to its tol-
erance to hypochlorite under usual condi-
tions of drinking water disinfection was
recovered. Yersinia is 100% inactivated by
0.25 mg/L chlorine dioxide (39).
Psittacosis
Psittacosis is a disease primarily of birds but
also occurs in humans and in some lower
mammals (31). It is caused by a rickettsia-
like microorganism, Chlamydia psittaci. It is
cited as a potential adversary agent (presum-
ably aerosolized), although it is not known to
have been used or acquired (25). Asingle ref-
erence suggesting a potential for waterborne
infection was recovered (29).
Signs and symptoms of psittacosis
include chills and fever, headache, sore
throat, nausea, and vomiting; the case-fatality
rate is . 10% (31).
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The infective dose of psittacosis is
unknown.
Ch. psittaci is considered susceptible to
heat, similar to Rickettsia prowazekii. It is
stable for 18-24 hr in seawater (26).
Ch. psittaci is inactivated by 1% sodium
hypochlorite (26), but no reference to its tol-
erance to hypochlorite under usual conditions
ofdrinkingwaterdisinfection was recovered.
Coxiella (QFever)
Coxiella burnetii, a rickettsial (18) or rick-
ettsia-like (40) organism common among
domestic farm animals, causes Q fever in
humans and is considered incapacitating
rather than lethal. Co. burnetii has been
weaponized in aerosol form (19,40) and is
believed to have potential for infection
through drinking water (25,29), although it
is commonly transmitted through inhalation
(31). Benenson (22) noted possible transmis-
sion from cattle through raw milk.
According to Eitzen et al. (18),
Fever, cough, and pleuritic chest pain may occur
as early as ten days after exposure. Patients are
not generally critically ill, and the illness lasts
from 2 days to 2 weeks.
More serious complications may arise
(meningitis, inflammation ofthe heart), but
they are uncommon (40,41).
A human ID50 (unspecified route) of25
organisms has been estimated (25), corre-
sponding to a drinking water concentration
of< 1 organism/L for consumption ofeither
15 L/day or 5 L/day for 7 days. Others esti-
mated an infective dose as low as 1-10
organisms byinhalation (1,24,26).
Co. burnetiisurvives in tap water for 160
days at 20-22°C and resists heat, drying,
osmotic shock, and ultraviolet (UV) radia-
tion (18,26,40).
Co. burnetii is inactivated by 1% sodium
hypochlorite (26), but no reference to its tol-
erance to hypochlorite under usual condi-
tions of drinking water disinfection was
recovered. It is, however, resistant to "many
standard antiseptic compounds" (40).
Lindsten and Schmitt (42) found that Co.
burnetii was reduced to undetectable levels in
water treated with the ERDLator, a now-dis-
continued item ofarmy field equipment that
combined ferric chloride and limestone coag-
ulation with 0.8 mg/L residual chlorine disin-
fection, 20-min contact time, and diatomite
filtration. Under the same conditions, but
with a chlorine residual of0.5 mg/L, inactiva-
tion ofCo. burnetiiwas incomplete.
Salmonelloses
The Salmonellae are pathogens belonging to
the enteric bacilli. Salmonella typhimurium is
often found in outbreaks offood poisoning.
Salmonella was used by the Japanese Army
during World War II to contaminate food
and watersupplies ofChinese cities (19), and
there are reports suggesting that it has been
used by terrorists to contaminate drinking
water (25) as well as food (43).
Oftwo types ofsalmonelloses, acute gas-
troenteritis is commonly caused by S.
typhimurium, whereas typhoid fever is usually
caused by Salmonella typhi. Acute gastroen-
teritis is characterized by vomiting and diar-
rhea, whereas the symptoms for typhoid fever
are more general (31). Typhoid is readily
spread through food and water and through
contact with infected (sometimes asympto-
matic) carriers. During the American Civil
War, there were an estimated 75,000 military
typhoid cases and 27,000 deaths (34). More
recent data for acute gastroenteritis infections
indicate an overall case-fatality rate of
approximately 4%, with infants and persons
older than 50 years of age most seriously
affected (31).
The ED50 for S. typhihas been estimated
as 105 organisms (25). Others quoted oral
ED50 values for various Salmonella spp. in the
range of 104-105 organisms; one reference
listed the value as 15-20 cells for foodborne
salmonellosis (32). A dose of 104 organisms
would correspond to a drinking water con-
centration of - 100 organisms/L for con-
sumption of 15 L/day or 300 organisms/L for
consumption of5 L/dayfor 7days.
S. typhi survival in environmental media
is 29-58 days in soil, 9 days in seawater, 8
days in fresh water (26), and up to 5 months
in ice (34). S. typhimurium survival is about
the same.
Since the introduction of chlorine treat-
ment ofmunicipal water, waterborne typhoid
has virtually disappeared in the United States.
S. typhimurium requires a UV radiation dose
of 15.2 mW*sec/cm2 at 253.7 nm to achieve
> 99.9% inactivation (44).
Shigellosis
Shigellosis is a bacillary dysentery caused by
the ingestion of various Shigella species, in
particular Shigella dysenteriae. Shigella spp.
are most commonly disseminated under
conditions of poor hygiene through "direct
or indirect fecal-oral transmission" (22).
Shigella cultures were used by the Japanese
Army during World War II to contaminate
food and water supplies of Chinese cities
(19). Sh. dysenteriae has been implicated in
intentional food contamination (45) and
should be considered a threat to potable
water supplies as well (31)
The signs and symptoms of shigellosis
are diarrhea, abdominal pain, and bloody
stools after an incubation period ofapproxi-
mately 48 hr. Shigellosis is a common dis-
ease offield armies, and asymptomatic carri-
ers are important in maintenance and spread
ofthe infection (31).
The infective dose of Shigellaflexneri,
one of the dysentery bacilli, is 104_108
organisms, based on studies of human vol-
unteers (31). The lower dose would corre-
spond to a drinking water concentration of
- 100 organisms/L for consumption of 15
L/day or 300 organisms/L for consumption
of 5 L/day for 7 days. There are, however,
great differences in individual susceptibility;
one reference quotes an infective dose of 100
organisms by ingestion for Sh.flexneri (26),
whereas another indicates ED50 values from
10 to 109 organisms for unspecifiedbacillary
dysentery (32). Endemic incidence ofshigel-
losis among infants and children is much
higher than among adults (31). Cooper et al.
(39) developed a procedure for estimating
the percentage of troops likely to become ill
with shigellosis depending on the raw water
source and thedegree oftreatment.
Shigella spp. survive 2-3 days in water
(26), and there have been recent outbreaks of
shigellosis traced to recreational waters (46).
Sh. dysenteriae is 99.6-100% inactivated
by an FAC residual of 0.05 mg/L in - 10
min at pH 7 and 20-29°C (27). UV radia-
tion is also effective and practical for small
systems, achieving > 99.9% inactivation at a
dose of3.4 mW.sec/cm2 at 253.7 nm (44).
Virtually all recent outbreaks ofshigellosis
have been limited to individual or noncom-
munity water supplies or recreational waters
(46), suggesting that properly disinfected
watersprovide a reliable barrier to Shigella.
Tularemia
Tularemia is an epizootic disease of animals
(especially rabbits and rodents), transmissi-
ble to humans, caused by the bacillus
Francisella tularensis (formerly Pasteurella
tularensis). F. tularensis has been weaponized
in the aerosol form (19); contaminated water
is also a source ofdisease (22,29,417).
Depending on the route of infection,
there are several recognized clinical types of
tularemia, among which are pulmonary,
glandular, or ulceroglandular (commonly
from handling an infected animal carcass),
and typhoidal (from direct ingestion).
Typhoidal tularemia produces influenza-like
symptoms and may result in death if
untreated (18,30,31,47).
An infective dose may involve as few as
10-50 organisms, or less, by inhalation
(18,24-26,48) or as many as 108 by oral
challenge (18). The larger number would
correspond to a drinking water concentra-
tion of 106 organisms/L for consumption of
15 L/day or 3 x 106 for consumption of 5
L/day for 7days.
F. tularensis can survive for months in
water or mud and may even multiply under
these conditions (18,31). It is inactivated by
heat (26) but is resistant to freezing (18).
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P. tularensis (F tularensis) is 99.6-100%
inactivated by 0.5-1.0 mg/L FAC at 10°C
and pH 7 in approximately 5 min (27).
However, other studies show that chlorine
(0.5-2.0 mg/L) is ineffective against
tularemia (32).
EpidemicTyphus
Epidemic or classic typhus is a louseborne
disease caused by the rickettsial agent R.
prowazekii, commonly associated with
crowded conditions and poor hygiene.
McGeorge (25) considers R. prowazekii a
lethal agent suitable for aerosol dissemina-
tion. No reference was recovered suggesting
apotable water threat.
After an incubation period of5-18 days,
signs and symptoms of epidemic typhus
indude high fever, chills, intense headache,
back and muscle pains, and skin eruptions
(31), as well as mental and physical depres-
sion (30). Although it is estimated that
315,000 persons died from epidemic typhus
in Serbia in 1915 (31), the case-fatality rate
increases with age and varies from 10 to
40% (22).
An infective dose offewer than 10 organ-
isms has been estimated, corresponding to a
drinking water concentration of < 1 organ-
ism/L for consumption ofeither 15 L/day or
5 L/day for 7 days, ifin fact epidemic typhus
is transmissible through water (26).
R. prowazekii, unlike other rickettsia, is
considered heat sensitive, surviving < 15 min
at 50°C in milk (26).
Rprowazekiiis inactivated by 1% sodium
hypochlorite (26), but no reference to its tol-
erance to hypochlorite under usual conditions
ofdrinkingwaterdisinfection was recovered.
Encephalomyclitis
Encephalomyelitis is any one ofseveral viral,
usually arthropodborne, diseases of animals
to which humans may be susceptible.
Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE)
has been weaponized in aerosol form
(18,19,49). No reference suggestingpotential
as an agent ofdrinking water contamination
was recovered.
According to Stedman (30), VEE in
humans causes fever and severe headache after
an incubation period of2-5 days, and in afew
cases there has been central nervous system
involvement. Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and
sorethroat mayfollow. Full recoverytakes 1-2
weeks, andcasefatalityis < 1% (1$).
An ID50 of25 virus particles is estimat-
ed (25), corresponding to a drinking water
concentration of < 1 particle/L for con-
sumption ofeither 15 or 5 L/day for 7 days.
Franz et al. (24) indicate an infective dose of
10-100 organisms by aerosol. However, it is
unlikely that VEE would be transmissible
through water.
Parker et al. (26) state that VEE virus is
sensitive to UV light, which maysuggest that
itwould eventuallybe destroyed bysunlight.
VEE virus is inactivated by 1% sodium
hypochlorite (26), but no reference to its tol-
erance to hypochlorite under usual condi-
tions of drinking water disinfection was
recovered. However, Eitzen et al. (18) note
that VEE virus is "rather easily killed byheat
and disinfectants."
EntericViruses
The enteric viruses, commonly transmitted
by the fecal-oral route in infants, should be
considered potable water threats. Iraq has
researched enterovirus 17 (Picornaviridae)
and human rotavirus (Reoviridae), both of
which cause gastrointestinal disorders, but
has apparently notweaponized either (17).
Signs and symptoms of rotaviral infec-
tions include vomiting, abdominal distress,
diarrhea, and dehydration. Hospitalization
and even death mayoccuramonginfants and
elderly patients, but rarely among otherwise
healthy young adults, almost all ofwhom
give evidence ofprevious infection and carry
some immunity (50). The incubation period
ofrotavirus infection is estimated as 19 hr to
2 days (50).
According to a risk model, members of
the general publicwho ingested six rotavirus
particles in a day (< 1/L) would have a 50%
probability ofbecoming infected and a 25%
probability of becoming ill; after 7 days
these probabilities become 70 and 35%,
respectively (50).
At least one strain ofrotavirus may per-
sist for 8-32 days in surface waters and > 64
days in tapwater (50).
Reported chlorine concentration-time
values, from 0.01 to 0.5 for 99% inactiva-
tion at 5C and neutral pH (50), indicate
that rotavirus should be effectively destroyed
by army field water disinfection practices, as
well as by most municipal practices. Powers
et al. (7) report better than 4-log reduction
ofsimian rotavirus in < 20 min at tempera-
tures of 5-25°C by sodium dichloroisocya-
nurate or Globaline (7).
Powers et al. (51) reported the removal
of. 99.99% rotavirus by the hand-operated
Survivor 35 RO unit (Recovery Engineering,
Inc., Minneapolis, MN).
V'iral Hemorrhagic Fever
The viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) arise
from several different viral families and
include yellow fever, dengue fever, and Rift
Valleyfever (all arthropodborne) (31), aswell
as lassa fever, Ebola-Marburg viral diseases,
and hantaviral diseases, among others (18).
They may have been weaponized for aerosol
application, but no reference was recovered
suggesting a potable water threat.
According to Stedman's Medical
Dictionary(30),
the hemorrhagic fever syndrome is associated
with high fever, scattered petechiae, gastrointesti-
nal tract and other organ bleeding, hypotension,
andshock; kidneydamage maybe severe...
In the case ofEbola virus, fatality rates may
range from 50 to 90% (18) or greater (52).
Although Jensen et al. (32 suggested an
ID50 by ingestion of 1 pg, which they equate
to 105_1010 partides for all the VHF viruses
(32), Franz et al. (24) proposed an infective
dose by aerosol of 1-10 organisms. An
ingested dose of 105 would correspond to
- 1,000 particles/L for consumption of 15
L/day or 3,000/L for consumption of 5
L/day, if indeed VHFs are transmissible
throughwater.
Lassa fever virus is rapidly inactivated at
56°C; the otherviruses require 30 min expo-
sure at that temperature. All are inactivated
byUV light (26).
All of the listed VHF viruses are inacti-
vated by 1-2% sodium hypochlorite and/or
1% iodine (26), but no reference to their
chlorine tolerance under usual conditions of
drinkingwaterdisinfection was recovered.
Variola (Smallpox)
Variola major, also known as smallpox, is a
viral disease readily spread by person-to-per-
son contact. The Japanese Army explored
weaponization ofvariola virus during World
War 11(18), and McGeorge (25) considered
it suitable for dissemination through conta-
minated items. Otherwise, no reference was
recovered suggesting a potable water threat.
One concern about variola is that troops
have not been vaccinated since 1989 and
civilians since 1980 (18).
After an incubation period of approxi-
mately 12 days, signs and symptoms indude
chills, fever, prostration, headache, backache,
and vomiting, as well as pustule formation,
with a case fatality rate among the unvacci-
nated of25% or more (18,31).
The infective dose by aerosol is assumed
low (10-100 organisms) (24) or is very small
(25). At this time we cannot estimate an
infective level for drinking water with confi-
dence, if indeed variola is transmissable
through water.
The variola virus is resistant to drying
(26); viable variola virus has been recovered
from scabs 13 years aftercollection (53).
Variola virus is inactivated by 1% sodium
hypochlorite (26), but no reference to its tol-
erance to hypochlorite under usual conditions
ofdrinkingwaterdisinfection was recovered.
Cryptosporidiosis
Cryptosporidiosis is a gastrointestinal infec-
tion resulting from ingestion of the oocysts
ofa protozoan, Cr;ptosporidiumparvum. It is
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commonly contracted from drinking water
contaminated with cattle wastes. To the best
of our knowledge, Cr. parvum has not been
weaponized. However, it has been suggested
as a potential agent for sabotaging potable
water supplies by reason ofits infectivity and
ready availability (54).
The signs and symptoms of cryp-
tosporidiosis are profuse watery diarrhea,
nausea, and stomach cramps. The incuba-
tion period is 4-14 days, and for otherwise
healthy individuals the symptoms last 10-15
days (55). For immune-compromised
patients, symptoms last much longer and
may be life-threatening.
The ID50 for healthy volunteers is 132
ingested viable oocysts (55); Haas et al. (5)
determined the average infective dose as
238.6 oocysts for the general population,
with 95% confidence limits of 132.0-465.4.
However, the ID 50 for some highly infectious
strains of Cr. parvum may be reduced by half
(56). Without considering whether oocysts
are cleared from the gut before excysting, a
dose of 132 oocysts would correspond to a
drinking water concentration of approxi-
mately 1 oocyst/L for consumption of 15
L/day over 7 days, or about 3 oocysts/1, for
consumption of5 L/day.
Cr. parvum oocysts are stable in water for
days or more, but they are heat sensitive.
Cryptosporidium is an emerging pathogen
for which disinfection regimens are still being
developed. Cr. parvum oocysts are highly
resistant to chlorine-based disinfection and to
chlorine dioxide (6), but sequential combina-
tions ofchlorine and other disinfectants show
promise (57). UV light systems of an
advanced design have achieved > 4 log10 inac-
tivation of Cr. parvum oocysts (58).
The ROWPU will remove 100% of Cir.
parvum oocysts, which are 3-7 pm in size.
Many individual water purifiers will reduce
oocysts by at least 3 log10, as will 10-inch
(25-cm) melt-blown polypropylene depth
filters of 3-pm absolute pore size. However,
< 90% removal of Cr. parvum oocysts is
achieved by the 5.0-pm nominal pore size
spiral-wound cotton prefilters of the
ROWPU (14). Removal ofoocysts by direct
filtration will approach 3 logl0 in well-oper-
ated municipal systems (57) and may exceed
5 log,(1 for slow sand filtration (44) or
diatomaceous earth filtration (57), but chlo-
rination of the product water provides no
protection iffiltration performance degrades.
Mycotoxins: Aflatoxins
Aflatoxins are metabolites of the mold
Aspergillusflavus, which infects a variety of
agricuiltural plants including peanuts. They
are potent mutagens and carcinogens.
Although not as acutely toxic as botulinum,
staphylococcal enterotoxins, or even ricin,
and lacking properties useful for biological
warfare (17), they have been weaponized by
Iraq for missile delivery (16,17).
Acute aflatoxin poisoning is character-
ized by jaundice, rapidly developing ascites
(abdominal fluid), and portal hypertension,
with a high mortality rate usually resulting
from massive gastrointestinal bleeding. In
children, aflatoxin produces Reye syndrome:
disturbed consciousness, fever, convulsions,
and vomiting (59).
The signs and symptoms described are
produced by an average intake of 2-6
mg/day of aflatoxins (59). An ID51 of
10-100 mg/person has been estimated for
aflatoxin B by an unspecified route ofexpo-
sure (32). A safe exposure would need to be
< 10 pg/L for consumption of 15 L/day.
The aflatoxins have limited water solu-
bility and are probably heat stable.
Aflatoxins are probably chlorine tolerant
tinder normal disinfection conditions, but
this needs to be determined.
Anatoxin A
Anatoxin A, also known as the very fast
death factor, is an alkaloid neurotoxin pro-
duced by the filamentous freshwater
cyanobacteria Anabaenaflos-aquae.
Wild and domestic animals poisoned by
anatoxin through ingestion have been
observed in the field to be staggering, gasp-
ing, and suffering convulsions (60). Death by
respiratory arrest occurs in minutes to hours.
The LD50 (intraperitoneal) for mice is
200 pg/kg, with 4-7 min survival (60). The
data are insufficient for developing a drink-
ing water NOAEL for anatoxin A.
Anatoxin A is converted to a nontoxic
form in water under ambient conditions in
several days (61).
Chlorine is ineffective against cyanobac-
terial toxins at typical levels (32).
Alum flocculation, filtration, and chlori-
nation are ineffective in the removal of
cyanobacterial toxins, and Vuori et al. (62)
found that an individual hand-operated
drinking water purifier containing carbon,
ion exchange resin, and silver achieved only
an approximately 50% reduction in anatoxin
A concentration, although RO was corin-
pletely effective.
Botulinum Toxins
Botulinum toxins are derived from protein
toxins produced by Clostridium botulinum
and exist in seven neurotoxic forms.
Botulinum toxins have been weaponized by
Iraq and others for aerosol application
(16-19). To successfully contaminate a
potable water supply, a biotoxin even as
lethal as botulinum toxins must be intro-
duced downstream from treatment facilities
and be able to survive contact with chlorine.
The quantities involved make it impractical
to poison large reservoirs (54).
Botulinum toxins are unusual in that
they are more toxic when ingested than
when inhaled (18), although they are less
toxic than when injected (63). Symptoms
may be experienced within 24-36 hr. A pro-
gressive paralysis from head to toe follows,
usually seen first in drooping eyelids (18,64).
The victim remains mentally alert for the
duration of the illness, and death results
from the inability to breathe.
The lD511 in mice by intraperitoneal or
intravenous injection is approximately 0.001
pg/kg for most of the botulintim toxins
(1,63,65). A human inhalation LD50 of
0.003 pg/kg has been estimated (65) and an
oral LD5 of 0.4 upg/person (0.006 pg/kg)
has been estimated based on 18 case reports
of botulism, 16 of which were fatal (66). A
conservative NOAEL would be 6 x 10`
pg/L for water consumption of 15 L/day.
Sunlight inactivates botulinum toxins
within 1-3 hr. They are detoxified in air with-
in 12 hr. The toxins are destroyed after 30
min at 80°C, after several minutes at I00°C
(26), and by boiling or sterilization (61).
Botulinum toxins are > 99.7% inactivat-
ed by 3 mg/L FAC in 20 min, similar to the
army disinfection procedure, and are 84%
inactivated by 0.4 mg/L FAC in 20 min (67),
similar to municipal disinfection procedures.
In one RO field study > 99.988%
removal ofbotulinum toxins from raw water
spiked with the toxin was reported (42).
Treatment systems using charcoal should
effectively remove the toxin (25); thus,
some individual water purifiers may provide
protection.
Microcystins
The microcystins are hepatotoxic products
of freshwater blooms of cyanobacteria of
Microcystis spp., M aeruginosa in particular.
Microcystin-LR, also known as the fast
death factor, is the most common of the
microcystins (68) and presumably the toxin
of choice to be weaponized. Although the
aerosolized form of microcystin is the most
likely threat, ingestion even from natural
sources must be considered a significant
hazard (68).
Microcystins have been implicated in the
death of htiman dialysis patients (69). The
toxic effect of microcystin administered
intraperitoneally is rapid; it affects bile flow in
< 10 min. Death in laboratory animals is due
to hypovolemic shock caused by interstitial
hemorrhage following liver necrosis (60,66).
Mice administered the aerosol LD50, 67
pg/kg, died within hours (66). An ID50 of
1-10 mg (per person) for microcystin by an
unspecified route of exposure has been esti-
mated (32). A conservative drinking water
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NOAEL for microcystin would be 10 pg/L
for soldiers consuming 15 L/day; however,
the World Health Organization has adopted
a drinking water standard of 1.0 pg/L total
microcystins for lifetime exposure.
The microcystins are all water soluble
and temperature stable (61,66).
Microcystin is essentially unaffected by
30 min exposure to 100 mg/L FAC (67).
Iodine has no effect at 16 mg/L.
Microcystin removal from water by RO
is > 90%, but coagulation/flocculation was
not effective (6), in agreement with earlier
findings that alum flocculation, filtration,
and chlorination are ineffective in the
removal ofcyanobacterial toxins. Vuori et al.
(62) found that an individual hand-operated
drinking water purifier containing carbon,
ion exchange resin, and silver had no effect
on microcystin concentration, although RO
was completely effective.
Ricin
Ricin is derived from the bean ofthe castor
plant. Waste from the production of castor
oil is approximately 3-5% ricin (1).
Although ricin is relatively easy to obtain, it
does not pose a serious threat as aweapon of
mass destruction, considering the quantity
required to overwhelm a military or civilian
infrastructure (1). Its preferred use seems to
be as an assassin's weapon, and there are
documented cases ofumbrellas being used as
a means of injecting a "ricin ball" into a
human target (70). Ricin is considered a
potential aerosol threat (71), and Iraq carries
ricin in its BW inventory (16,17). Because
ricin is significandy less toxic by oral inges-
tion than by other routes (72), it is a less
credible threat in drinking water.
Signs and symptoms are most severe
when ricin is injected. The central nervous
system is affected soon after injection. Heart
function is drastically decreased and convul-
sions occur after the toxin blocks synapse
actions in the brain. Death occurs soon after.
Ifingested, ricin causes gastrointestinal hem-
orrhage (bloody diarrhea) with organ necrosis
(18). If inhaled, ricin attacks the lungs, and
damage begins within 8-12 hr, although signs
maynotbecomeevident for 12-24 hr(1).
The oral LD50 for mice is 20 mg/kg
(72). An estimated 100% lethal dose of
50-100 pgtotal dose per os (66) for humans
is probably an outlier. A conservative
NOAEL would be 2 pg/L for water con-
sumption of15 L/day.
Ricin is detoxified in 10 min at 80°C
(26) and in - 1 hr at 50°C (pH 7.8); it is sta-
ble under ambient conditions (61).
Ricin is > 99.4% inactivated after 20
min treatment with FAC at 100 mg/L, but
is essentially unchanged at 10 mg/L (67).
Iodine has no measurable effect at 16 mg/L.
RO is > 99.8% efficient in removing ricin
from product water, but coagulation/floccula-
tion was not effective (67). A treatment sys-
tem using charcoal should effectively remove
ricin (25); thus, some individual or point-of-
usewaterpurifiers mayprovide protection.
Saxitoxin
Saxitoxin, the cause ofparalytic sheufish poi-
soning, is produced by the marine dinoflagel-
late Gonyaulax, among others. Saxitoxin is
highly toxic by ingestion, more toxic still by
injection, and perhaps most toxic by aerosol
administration (66). It has been weaponized
forcovert purposes (19).
Signs and symptoms occur within 30 min
after ingestion and indude abdominal distress,
diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, vertigo, headache,
rapid pulse, and numbness ofthe tongue and
gums, leading to paralysis (66,73). Death can
occur in 1-24 hrbecauseofrespiratoryfailure.
The only treatments are general supportive
careandartificial respiration.
The LD50 for saxitoxin by ingestion is
estimated as 0.3-1.0 mg/person (66). Acon-
servative NOAEL for saxitoxin would be 0.1
pg/L for a soldier consuming 15 L/day of
potablewater.
Saxitoxin is water soluble, acid stable,
alkaline labile, and stable at normal atmos-
pheric conditions (26,61).
Saxitoxin is essentially unaffected by 30
min exposure to 10 mg/L FAC but is > 99%
inactivated at 100 mg/L FAC (67). Iodine
(Globaline) has no effect at 16 mg/L.
Saxitoxin removal from water by RO is
> 98.9%, but coagulation/flocculation is not
effective (67). Removal by charcoal may be
marginal at the normal pH of drinking
water, atwhich saxitoxin is strongly cationic.
Staphylococcal Enterotoxins
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB), which
has been weaponized (19), is one ofa num-
ber of protein toxins produced by bacteria
such as Staphylococcus aureus. SEB can be
either inhaled (aerosolization) or ingested
from contaminated water or food, and could
be used to sabotage food or low volume
water supplies (18).
SEB is an incapacitating toxin, causing
severe gastrointestinal pain, projectile vomit-
ing, and diarrhea if ingested, and fever,
chills, headache, muscle aches, shortness of
breath, and nonproductive cough if inhaled
(18,24,31,74). Signs and symptoms develop
within several hours, but diminish after sever-
al more. Full recovery is likely, but soldiers
couldbe incapacitatedforup to 2weeks (18).
Franzet al. (24) state that 30 ng/person is
incapacitating and 1.7 pg/person is lethal by
aerosol (75). ED50 values for humans are var-
iously reported as 1-4 pg (31), 20-50 pg
(3X2, and 20-25 pg/person (66) by ingestion.
SEB can be lethal, but doses causing inca-
pacitation are at least 100 times less (1). A
conservative NOAEL would be 0.01 pg/L
forwaterconsumption of15 L/day.
SEB is stable in both acidic and basic
solutions. It is inactivated at 100°C after a
few minutes and does not survive for long at
room temperature (26).
The disinfection efficacy of SEB is
unknown.
Water treatment systems using charcoal
should remove SEB (25); thus, some indi-
vidual and point-of-use water purifiers may
provide protection.
Mycotoxins: T-2
T-2 toxin is one of several trichothecene
mycotoxins isolated from cereal grains infect-
ed with Fusarium and some other genera of
fungi. Russian experience with infected agri-
cultural products indicates that ingested tri-
chothecenes could impose a deadly threat
(18,66,76). Unconfirmed and controversial
findings suggest the use oftrichothecenes as
BW agents in Laos, Cambodia, and
Afghanistan, and Iraq has investigated the
weaponization of trichothecenes (17). Other
trichothecenes, viz., nivalenol, 4-deoxyni-
valenol, and diacetoxyscirpenol, may be pre-
sent in crude preparations; their toxicities are
probablysimilarto but no greater than thatof
T-2 (66).
Topical exposure to T-2 toxin causes blis-
tering, skin necrosis, and other effects.
Sublethal effects ofingested T-2 toxin indude
lightheadedness, nausea, vomiting, and diar-
rhea (18,66). Eitzen et al. (18) described a
protracted lethal illness after an accidental
ingestion ofbreadcontaminated byFusarium
The short-term U.S. Department of
Defense Tri-Service field water quality
standards for T-2 toxin are 26 and 8.7 pg/L
for the consumption of 5 and 15 L/day,
respectively (77).
The stability of T-2 toxin in water at
room temperature is such that breakdown
does not occur fast enough over the course
of7 days to negate potential health concerns
for militarypersonnel (78).
T-2 toxin is < 3% inactivated by 100
mg/L FAC after 30-min exposure at room
temperature (67). Iodine has no effect at
16 mg/L.
T-2 toxin removal from water by RO is
> 99.9%, but coagulation/flocculation was
not effective (67). A treatment system using
charcoal should effectively remove T-2 toxin
(25); thus, some individual or point-of-use
water purifiers mayprovideprotection.
Tetrodotoxin
Tetrodotoxin is a potent neurotoxin that has
caused the deaths ofmany humans as a result
of consumption of improperly prepared
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pufferfish (66). It was likely investigated as a
potential BWweapon (25) and may be suffi-
ciently soluble to present a drinking water
threat (61).
The toxic signs of tetrodotoxin poison-
ing appear 10 min to 4 hr after ingestion
and include numbness of the lips, tongue,
and fingers, as well as anxiety, nausea, vom-
iting, and other symptoms, progressing with
time to paralysis. Death, usuallywithin 6 hr,
is due to respiratory failure (66,73). The
only treatment is artificial respiration, and
recovery can becomplete in 24 hr.
The oral lethal dose in humans has been
estimated as 1-2 mg (66), and the LD50 has
been estimated as 30 pg/kg (32). A conserva-
tive drinking water NOAEL for tetrodotoxin
would be 0.1 pg/L for consumption of 15
L/day.
Tetrodotoxin is soluble in slightly acid
water and is temperaturestable (61,66).
Tetrodotoxin is rapidly inactivated by 50
mg/L chlorine atpH < 3 and> 9 (66), but no
reference to the effect ofchlorine under nor-
maldrinkingwaterconditions was recovered.
Summary
BWagents as waterborne threats. The threat
potentials for 18 replicating agents are
summarized in Table 1. Although they are
intended primarily for aerosol application,
many of the bacterial agents have strong
potential as waterborne threats. The rick-
ettsial diseases, which arespreadprimarilyby
biting insects in nature, are less credible,
with the possible exception ofQ fever. The
viral diseases evaluated as BW agents, except
for the enteric viruses and possibly variola,
appear to have virtually no potential as
waterborne threats, and many adults have
acquired immunity to the enteric viruses
through childhood exposure. Given suffi-
cient quantities, the nine biotoxins (Table 2)
are potential waterborne threats, and they,
like the infectious agents, are generally stable
enough in the environment to be used as
drinking water contaminants. There will
doubtless be additions to both lists with
time. The practicality ofusing BW agents as
potable water contaminants has been
addressed elsewhere (54,70,79-81). With
few exceptions, the dose of any BW agent
required to cause adverse health effects is of
such magnitude as to make essential the tar-
geting of water supplies closest to the con-
sumer; these might include finished water
storagefacilities, vulnerable points in the dis-
tribution system, or even bottled water.
Targeting oflarge bodies of water such as
watersupply reservoirswould beimpractical,
even though intentional or collateral water
contamination could result from an aerosol
attack. In terms of quantities required to
present a credible threat, any or all of the
replicating agents indicated as positive water
threats ("yes" in Table 1) may be available
from domestic sources or rogue nation inter-
cession. Among the biotoxins, only BTX,
ricin, SEB, T-2 mycotoxin, and possibly
aflatoxin could likely be procured in suffi-
cient quantities at the present time.
Alternative synthetic techniques may make
some ofthe rare biotoxins available in quan-
tity in the future. In a nuclear/biological/
chemical environment, the greatest risk of
injury could be to those who service the
water treatment equipment and are exposed
to the agents at thehighest concentrations.
Incapacitatingeffects. The percentage of
troops disabled and the intensity of symp-
toms are largely unpredictable, but most
infectious agents cause extreme gastrointesti-
nal distress, with severe stomach pains, diar-
rhea, and vomiting. Some cases will need
hospitalization, andwithout prompt medical
care some may die. Symptoms of biotoxin
ingestion are also variable, although the
Table 1. Summary ofthreatpotential ofreplicating agents.
Agent/disease Weaponized Waterthreat Infective dosea Stable in water Chlorinetoleranceb
Anthrax Yes Yes 6,000 spores(inh) 2 years(spores) Spores resistant
Brucellosis Yes Probable 10,000organisms(uns) 20-72days Unknown
Cholera Unknown Yes 1,000organisms(ing) Surviveswell Easily killed
Clostridiumperfringens Probable Probable 108organisms(ing) Common in sewage Resistant
Glanders Probable Unlikely 3.2 x 106organisms(uns) Up to 30days Unknown
Melioidosis Possible Unlikely Unknown Unknown Unknown
Plague Probable Yes 500organisms(inh) 16days Unknown
Psittacosis Possible Possible Unknown 18-24hr, seawater Unknown
Qfever Yes Possible 25organisms(uns) Unknown Unknown
Salmonella Unknown Yes 104organisms(ing) 8days, fresh water Inactivated
Shigellosis Unknown Yes 104organisms(ing) 2-3days Inactivated, 0.05 ppm, 10 min Tularemia Yes Yes 108organisms(ing) Up to 90days Inactivated, 1 ppm, 5 min
Typhus Probable Unlikely 10organisms(uns) Unknown Unknown
Encephalomyelitis Probable Unlikely 25particles(aer) Unknown Unknown
Enteric viruses Unknown Yes 6 particles(ing) 8-32days Readily inactivated(rotavirus) Hemorrhagic fever Probable Unlikely 105particles(ing) Unknown Unknown
Smallpox Possible Possible 10particles(uns) Unknown Unknown
Cryptosporidiosis Unknown Yes 132 oocysts(ing) Stabledays or more Resistant
Abbreviations: aer, aerosol; ing,ingestion; inh,inhalation; uns,unspecified.
°Total infective dose used to calculate watervalues.bAmbienttemperature, < 1 ppmfree available chlorine, 30 minor as indicated.
Table2.Summary ofthreatpotential of biotoxins.
Biotoxin Weaponized Waterthreat NOAEL, 2 L/daya Stable in water Chlorinetoleranceb
Aflatoxin Yes Yes 75pg/L Probably stable Probablytolerant
Anatoxin A Unknown Probable Unknown Inactivated indays Probablytolerant Botulinum toxins Yes Yes 0.0004pg/L Stable Inactivated, 6 ppm, 20 min Microcystins Possible Yes 1.0pg/Lc Probably stable Resistant at 100 ppm Ricin Yes Yes 15pg/L Stable Resistant at 10 ppm Saxitoxin Possible Yes 0.4pg/[ Stable Resistant at 10 ppm Staphylococcal enterotoxins Probable Yes 0.1 pg/L Probably stable Unknown T-2 mycotoxin Probable Yes 65pg/Ld Stable Resistant Tetrodotoxin Possible Yes 1 pg/L Probablystable Inactivated, 50 ppm
NOAEL, no-observed-adverse-effect level.
&Estimated as 7.5 times the NOAEL calculated for consumption of 15 U/day. hAmbienttemperature, <1 ppm free available chlorine, 30 minor as indicated. "World Health Organization drinking waterstandard. dDerived from short-term U.S. Departmentof DefenseTri-Service standard(771.
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range ofindividual susceptibilities is general-
ly narrower than for infectious agents.
Extreme gastrointestinal distress, often
accompanied by hemorrhaging and/or paral-
ysis, is common. Again, many victims may
die without immediate medical care. A pro-
cedure has been developed for estimating the
percentage of troops likely to become ill
from ingestion ofenteric pathogens depend-
ing on the raw water source and the degree
oftreatment (3$5l, and it may be possible to
expand this approach to include most or all
BWpathogens.
Efficacy ofwater treatment. A properly
functioning RO system with quality mem-
branes should, by size exclusion, reduce any
BWagent to a safe level in the product water
(42), although low molecular weight toxins
such as the mycotoxin T-2 may in time pene-
trate an intact RO membrane. Such a sus-
tained challenge would probably be beyond
an adversary's capability, however. In general,
failure of the ROWPU to consistently pro-
vide BW agent-free water would be an indi-
cation of failed membranes or leaking seals;
however, several reports have documented
apparent exceptions to size exclusion of
microbes from RO permeate (8-10). When
RO is not used forwater purification (aswith
diatomaceous earth filters, most individual
water purifiers, or pickup water) or when the
membranes of the ROWPU are deliberately
bypassed, the ultimate protection against
infectious agents may be disinfection. Awell-
designed and well-operated municipal water
treatment plant with filtration can be expect-
ed to achieve 2-3 logl0 removal of bacteria
(omitting consideration of disinfection)
(12,13) and 2-4 logl0 removal ofprotozoan
cysts (13,54. For the proteinaceous biotox-
ins, i.e., BTX, ricin, and SEB, as much as 1
logl0 removal may be possible under optimal
conditions of coagulation and flocculation.
Some agents, including anthrax spores,
Cryptosporidium oocysts, and most biotoxins,
are nearly impervious to FAC used for disin-
fection, whereas for many others there is no
useful information. Only limited indication
ofthe efficacy ofiodine compounds or silver
(used in some individual water purifiers) was
found. Some individual and point-of-use
water purifiers are potentially capable of
removing infectious agents or biotoxins from
water, and some may remove both, but few
have been rigorouslytested.
Research needs. There is a critical need
for rapid online and field methods for
detecting and quantifying both infectious
agents and biotoxins in water and in other
environmental samples. Indeed, much
promising research, such as use of the poly-
merase chain reaction to amplify bacterial
DNA, is directed toward addressing this
deficiency. Of equal importance is the
requirement to determine the tolerance of
BW agents for chlorine and other water dis-
infectants, because disinfection may be the
ultimate barrier. Finally, there is a need to
determine the efficacy ofavailable individual
and point-of-use water purifiers with respect
to removal or inactivation ofBWagents.
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